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Abstract
We present POSEIDON, a new anomaly-based network
intrusion detection system. POSEIDON is payload-based,
and has a two-tier architecture: the first stage consists of
a Self-Organizing Map, while the second one is a modified
PAYL system. Our benchmarks on the 1999 DARPA data
set show a higher detection rate and lower number of false
positives than PAYL and PHAD.
1 Introduction
Intrusion detection systems were introduced by Ander-
son [1] and formalized later by Denning [11]. Nowa-
days, there exist two main types of network intrusion de-
tection methods: anomaly-based and signature-based. In
signature-based methods, (e.g. Snort [29, 30]) a character-
istic trait of the intrusion is developed off-line, and then
loaded in the intrusion database before the system can begin
to detect this particular intrusion. This usually yields good
results in terms of low false positives, but has drawbacks:
firstly in most systems, all new attacks will go unnoticed
until the system is updated, creating a window of opportu-
nity for attackers to gain control of the system under attack.
Secondly, only known attacks can be detected, and while
this could be acceptable for detecting attacks to e.g., the
OS, it makes it much harder to use signature-based system
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for protecting web-based services, because of their ad-hoc
nature. Notably, the protection of web-services is becoming
a high-impact problem [15].
Anomaly-based systems (ABS), on the other hand, build
statistical models that describe the normal behaviour of the
network, and flag any behaviour that significantly deviates
from the norm as an attack. This has the advantage that new
attacks will be detected as soon as they take place. ABS
can be applied also to ad-hoc networked systems such as
web-based services. The disadvantage is that ABS needs
an extensive model building phase: a significant amount of
data (and thus a significant period of time) is needed to build
accurate models of legal behaviour.
Most network intrusion detections systems in use today
are signature-based, however, new attacks are devised with
increasing frequency every day (see [15] for weekly and
monthly single attack rates), so anomaly-based systems be-
come increasingly attractive.
Every network intrusion detection system suffers from
(1) false positives (false alarms), in which legal behaviour
is incorrectly flagged as an attack and (2) false negatives,
or misses, in which true attacks are undetected. Anomaly-
based systems are more vulnerable to these problems than
signature-based systems because they use statistical models
to detect intrusions.
ABS can extract information to detect attacks from dif-
ferent layers: packet headers, packet payload or both.
Header information is mainly useful to recognize attacks
aiming at vulnerabilities of the network stack implementa-
tion or probing the operating system to identify active net-
work services. On the other hand, payload information is
most useful to identify attacks against vulnerable applica-
tions (since the connection that carries the attack is estab-
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lished in a normal way) [32]. Without pretending to be
globally better than other types of ABS, payload-based sys-
tems have importance of their own, as they are particularly
suitable for detecting popular attacks such as those on the
HTTP protocol, and worms (see Wang and Stolfo [31] and
Costa et al. [9] for a discussion). Notably, PAYL and the
system of Kruegel et al. [19] are mainly payload-based,
while PHAD [24] is partly payload based.
Contribution In this paper we propose POSEIDON (Payl
Over Som for Intrusion DetectiON): a two-tier network in-
trusion detection architecture. The first tier consists of a
self-organizing map (SOM), and is used exclusively to clas-
sify payload data; the second tier consists of a slight mod-
ification of the well-known PAYL system [32] (see Figure
1).
POSEIDON is payload-based: it uses only destination
address and service port numbers to build a profile for each
port monitored, and it does not consider other header fea-
tures.
We have extensively benchmarked our system
w.r.t. PAYL [32] (also by replicating the PAYL ex-
periments) and PHAD [24] using the 1999 DARPA
benchmark [23]. PAYL and PHAD are the reference
ABS based on payload analysis. On this data set, our
experiments show:
• a higher detection rate and lower number of false pos-
itives than PAYL and PHAD.
• a reduction of the number of profiles used w.r.t. PAYL.
This has a positive influence on the runtime efficiency
of the system.
Incidentally, being payload-based, our system takes into
consideration only what Mahoney and Chan [25] call the le-
gitimate data of the 1999 DARPA data set, implying that we
can legitimately expect that the system in real life performs
as well as it does on the DARPA benchmark.
Let us now explain the reasons that brought us to the
development of this architecture. First of all, for the clas-
sification phase, we believe that a self-organizing map - in
general - can yield to a high quality classification, i.e. clus-
ters with a high intra-cluster similarity and high inter-cluster
dissimilarity, without having to take into account the length
of the packet. This can be used to build good profiles.
At the same time, we believe that a SOM is not as ef-
fective when it comes to the detection phase, i.e. to finding
whether a given packet is anomalous w.r.t. the cluster it has
been classified in. In a SOM, the detection phase is accom-
plished by comparing the current packet quantization error
with matching cluster quantization error: this method can
be heavily influenced by payload byte order, because it is
based on a distance function. For the detection, we believe
that the n-gram algorithm used by PAYL is more suitable.
On the other hand, we believe that the Achilles’ heel of
the PAYL architecture lies in the classification it adopts: the
algorithm uses packet payload length information to clas-
sify packets and thus to define clusters. This, together with
the fact that - for efficiency reasons - clusters have to be
merged, yields in our opinion to a too low intra-cluster
similarity: two packets belonging to the same cluster can
present very different byte distribution, without that this in-
dicates an attack.
By combining a SOM with the n-gram algorithm we ob-
tained an architecture that combines the advantages of the
SOM (the realization of clusters with high intra-cluster sim-
ilarity) with those of PAYL (the ability to detect when a
packet is anomalous w.r.t. a given cluster). The results we
have obtained on the DARPA substantiate our beliefs.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
the internals of POSEIDON and of PAYL; in Section 3 we
describe benchmarking experiments and compare obtained
results with PAYL and PHAD. In Section 4 we discuss other
related work. Finally, in Section 5 we draw our conclusions
and set the course for further developments. In the appendix
we report the pseudo-code of POSEIDON.
2 Architecture
Network intrusion detection systems are either packet-
oriented or connection-oriented. In the former architec-
ture, every packet is analysed as soon as it arrives, without
trying to correlate it with previous collected data. On the
other hand, connection-oriented systems work either by (a)
reassembling the whole connection (commonly only from
client to server) - waiting until the connection is closed - to
analyse the connection payload, or (b) by gathering statis-
tics which consider, e.g., the amount of bytes transmitted
and received, the duration of the connection, the protocol
type and final connection status.
POSEIDON, like most network intrusion detection sys-
tems, is packet-oriented. This architecture presents two
main advantages: firstly, POSEIDON can identify and
block an attack while it is taking place (intrusion preven-
tion). Secondly, connection-based systems are computa-
tionally more expensive, in particular they require a huge
amount of memory resources to keep all the segments to
analyse. This makes connection-based system more suit-
able for off-line analysis. On the other hand, connection-
based systems support a finer-grained analysis.
Our starting point is the PAYL architecture. Our algo-
rithm receives as input a packet and classifies the packet,
without prejudice for any of its properties, such as length,
destination port or application data semantics. The idea is
that the classifier keeps as much information as possible
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(a) PAYL
(b) POSEIDON
Figure 1. PAYL and POSEIDON architectures
about packets (e.g. high-dimensional data) for the anomaly
detection phase: we also want the classifier to operate in
an unsupervised manner. This is a typical clustering prob-
lem which can be properly tackled using neural networks
in general and Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) [18] in par-
ticular. SOMs have been widely used in the past both to
classify network data and to find anomalies. Here, we use
them for pre-processing.
Our architecture combines a SOM with a modified PAYL
algorithm. Figure 1 shows a comparison between our archi-
tecture and PAYL’s.
We now give a high-level description of the algorithms
underlying our system, a more formal description is re-
ported in the appendix. We first describe the SOM. Later
in the section, we introduce PAYL, focusing on the main
differences between our approach and the PAYL approach
towards classification of network data.
2.1 SOM classification model
Self organizing maps are defined as topology-preserving
single-layer maps in which the topological structure, im-
posed on the nodes in the network, is not changed dur-
ing classification (preserving neighbourhood relations) and
there is only one layer of nodes. A SOM is suitable to anal-
yse high-dimensional data and belongs to the category of
competitive learning networks [18]. Nodes are also called
neurons, to remind us of the artificial intelligence nature of
the algorithm. Each neuron n has a vector of weights wn as-
sociated to it: the dimension of the weights arrays is equal
to the length of longest input data. These arrays (also re-
ferred as reference vectors) determine the SOM behaviour.
To accomplish the classification, SOM goes through
three phases: initialization, training and classification.
Initialization First of all, some system parameters (num-
ber of nodes, learning rate and radius) have to be fixed by
e.g. the IDS technician. The number of nodes directly deter-
mines the classification given by the SOM: a small network
will classify different data inputs in the same node while a
large network will produce a too sparse classification. Af-
terwards, the array of node weights is initialized, usually
with random values (in the same range of input values).
Training The training phase consists of a number of it-
erations (also called epochs). At each iteration one input
vector x is processed as follows: x is compared to all neu-
ron weight arrays wn with a distance function (Euclidean or
Manhattan): the most similar node (also called best match-
ing unit, BMU) is then identified.
After the BMU has been found, the neighbouring neu-
rons and the BMU itself are updated. The following update
parameters are used: the neighbourhood is governed by the
radius parameter (r) and the magnitude of the attraction is
affected by the learning rate (α).
During this phase, the map tends to converge to a station-
ary distribution, which approximates the probability density
function of the high-dimensional input data.
As the learning proceeds and new input vectors are given
to the map, the learning rate and radius values gradually
decrease to zero.
Classification During the classification phase, the first
part of the training phase is repeated for each sample: the
input data is compared to all the weight arrays and the most
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similar neuron determines the classification of the sample
(but weights are not updated). The winning neuron is then
returned.
2.2 PAYL classification model
PAYL, is a n-gram [10] analysis algorithm, and uses a
classification method based on clustering of packet payload
data length.
PAYL classifies packets on the length of the payload.
During the training phase, for a given training data set,
PAYL computes a set of models Mijk. For each incom-
ing packet, with destination address j and destination port
k and payload length i, Mijk stores incrementally the av-
erage byte frequency and the standard deviation of each
byte frequency. During the detection phase, the same val-
ues are computed for incoming packets and then compared
to model values: a significant difference from the norm pro-
duces an alert. To compare models, PAYL uses a simplified
version of the Mahalanobis distance, which has the advan-
tage of taking into account not only the average value but
also its variance and the covariance of the variables mea-
sured.
The maximum amount of space required by PAYL is:
p∗l∗k, where p is the total number of ports monitored (each
host may have different ports), l is the length of the longest
payload and k is a constant representing the space required
to keep the mean and the variance distribution values for
each payload byte (PAYL uses a fixed value of 512).
To reduce the otherwise large number of models to be
computed, PAYL organizes models in clusters. After com-
paring two neighbouring models using the Manhattan dis-
tance, if the distance is smaller than a given threshold t,
models are merged: the means and variances are updated to
produce a new combined distribution. This process is re-
peated until no more models can be merged. Experiments
with PAYL show [32] that a reduction in the number of
model of up to a factor of 16 can be achieved.
Modification to PAYL Our modification to PAYL works
as follows: we pre-process each packet, using the SOM.
Afterwards PAYL uses the class value given by the SOM
(winning neuron) instead of the payload length. Technically
PAYL, instead of using model Mijk, uses the model Mnjk
where j and k are the usual destination address and port
and n is the classification derived from the neural network.
Then, mean and variance values are computed as usual.
Having added SOM to the system we must allow for both
the SOM and PAYL to be trained separately. Regarding re-
source consumption, we have to revise the required amount
of space to: p ∗ n ∗ k, where the new parameter n indicates
the amount of SOM network nodes.
3 Tuning and Experiments
In this section, we show the results of our benchmarks
and compare the performance of POSEIDON with PAYL
and PHAD. PAYL and PHAD are the two reference ADS
based on payload. They are the only two ABS based on
payload which have published their detection rate on the
DARPA 1999 data set.
3.1 SOM parameters tuning
The SOM algorithm needs several parameters on start-
up: the total number of network nodes, the function used
to compute the distance between vectors and the values of
the learning rate and update radius. For the sake of trans-
parency, we report here the values used in our experiments.
Concerning the number of neurons, a small network
would yield a too course classification, while a large net-
work will produce a sparse classification. In addition, it is
worth bearing in mind that the computational load increases
quadratically with the number neurons.
Experimenting with different initialization parameters
and using the quantization error method [18] to evaluate
the classification given by the network, we found the best
SOM with the following parameters:
• Number of neurons: 96 (rectangular
network of 12 by 8).
• Learning rate: 0.1.
• Update radius: 4.
• Distance function: Manhattan.
Hinneburg et al. [13] state that Manhattan distance per-
forms better than Euclidean distance in presence of high-
dimensional data: our experiments substantially confirm
this statement also in the case of network data analysis.
3.2 Experiments
We have benchmarked POSEIDON against PAYL (also
by replicating the experiment on PAYL) and PHAD, using
the same data used by PAYL and PHAD: the DARPA 1999
data set [23]. This standard data set is used as reference by
a number of researchers (e.g. [24, 27, 32]), and offers the
possibility of comparing the performance of various IDS.
This data set has been criticized because of the environ-
ment in which data were collected [26]; as explained by
Mahoney and Chan [25], it is possible to tune an IDS in
such a way that it scores particularly well on this particular
data set: some attributes – specifically: remote client ad-
dress, TTL, TCP options and TCP window size – have a
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Figure 2. Detection rates for ports 21 (FTP), 23 (Telnet), 25 (SMTP) and 80 (HTTP): the x-axis and y-
axis present false positive rate and detection rate respectively. POSEIDON presents always a higher
detection rate compared with PAYL at the same false positive rate. For the graph relative to port 21
see Remark in Section 3.2.
small range in the DARPA simulation, but have a large and
growing range in real traffic. IDS which take into account
the above-mentioned attributes are likely to score much bet-
ter on the DARPA set than in real life. Since our system
does not consider these attributes, we can legitimately ex-
pect that the system in real life performs as well as it does
on the DARPA benchmark.
To compare our model with PAYL, we apply the same
restrictions and conditions used by Wang and Stolfo [32]:
we focus only on inbound TCP packets, with data payload,
directed to hosts 172.016.0.0/16 and ports 1-1024.
We train the SOM clustering algorithm using internal
network traffic of week 1 and week 3 (12 days, 2.444.591
packets, attack free): for each different protocol we use a
different SOM. Then, we use the same data to build PAYL
models taking advantage of the classification given by the
neural network.
After this double training phase, it is possible to use the
testing weeks (4 and 5) to benchmark the network intru-
sion detection algorithm. This data contains several attack
instances (97 payload-based attacks are detectable applying
the same traffic filter mentioned above), as well as legal traf-
fic, directed against different hosts of the internal network:
the attack source can be situated both inside and outside the
network.
Figure 2 shows a detailed comparison of PAYL and PO-
SEIDON in terms of percentage of true negatives (reported
on the y axis) w.r.t. the percentage false positives (x axis).
Table 1 reports a summary of these results: the first column
reports PAYL’s statistics as we have inferred them from the
graphs reported by Wang and Stolfo [32]. The second col-
umn reports the figures we obtained by repeating Wang and
Stolfo’s benchmarks. In the repeated PAYL experiments
we used an un-clustered architecture, which yields on one
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PAYL PAYL exp POSEIDON
Number of profiles used 4065 (11312 - unclustered) 1622
HTTP DR 89,00% 90,00% 100,00%FP 0,17% 0,73% 0,0016%
FTP DR 95,50% 94,74% 100,00%FP 1,23% 11,41% (1,21%∗) 11,31% (0,93%∗)
Telnet DR 54,17% 53,65% 95,12%FP 4,71% 4,94% 6,72%
SMTP DR 78,57% 73,34% 100,00%FP 3,08% 8,35% 3,69%
Overall DR with FP < 1% 58,8% (57/97) 73,2% (71/97)∗
Table 1. Comparison between PAYL, our implementation of PAYL (PAYL exp) and POSEIDON; DR
stands for detection rate, while FP is the false positive rate
Type Attack PHAD POSEIDON
Probe ntinfoscan 66,67% (2/3) 100% (3/3)
Denial of Service
apache2 100% (3/3) 100% (3/3)
back 0% (0/4) 100% (4/4)
crashiis 71,43% (5/7) 100% (7/7)
Remote to Local phf 66,67% (2/3) 100% (3/3)ppmacro 33,34% (1/3) 100% (3/3)
Overall detection rate 65% (13/20) 100% (20/20)
Table 2. Comparison between PHAD and POSEIDON detection rates.
hand to a higher number of profiles, and on the other hand
to a different classification. The third column reports PO-
SEIDON’s result. Is it possible to observe that POSEIDON
overcomes PAYL on every benchmarked protocol: there is
a remark about FTP protocol (see the next paragraph).
Remark During FTP protocol benchmarks we found a
high rate of false positives (more than 3000 packets) both
with PAYL and with POSEIDON: all these packets are sent
by the same source host, which is sending FTP commands
in a way that is typical of the Telnet protocol (one charac-
ter per packet, with the TCP flag PUSH set). These packets
are marked as an attack because the training model does
not contain this kind of traffic over the FTP control channel
port, although it is normal traffic. During our experiments
with PAYL we found the same behaviour: for this reason
we decided to present benchmarks results of PAYL and PO-
SEIDON also without taking into account these packets (the
figures marked with an asterisk ∗ in Table 1 and the graph
in Figure 2).
Table 2 compares our results with PHAD: it is not pos-
sible to make a full comparison between the two systems,
because of the restrictions used by PHAD authors (they re-
strict to a maximum total amount of 100 false positives dur-
ing 10 days of testing). Nonetheless, we could legitimately
compare the two systems on the HTTP protocol, on which
POSEIDON meets the restrictions above.
Unfortunately, there is no other public available data set
suitable to compare our approach with previous researches
on anomaly intrusion detection: many authors use the KDD
99 data set [5] in which regrettably payload data is dis-
carded. Because we use payload information, we can not
use this data set to benchmark POSEIDON and models that
use this data set are not directly comparable with ours.
Concluding, the significant achieved improvement over
PAYL is determined by a better distribution of mean and
variance value within categories, obtained with introduction
of a new classification algorithm (SOM).
4 Related work
Network intrusion detection systems based on anomaly
detection have been widely studied for two decades. We re-
call that anomaly detection systems can operate in various
manners, sometimes extracting features from packet head-
ers and sometimes from payload data.
In this section we report on related work. First we de-
scribe other neural network-based systems then we address
statistical-based systems.
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4.1 Neural networks based systems
We start by presenting other neural-network based IDS.
We cannot benchmark these systems with POSEIDON be-
cause their authors use either private data sets (Cannady [6],
Labib and Vemuri [20] and Ramadas et al. [28]), or data sets
that do not contain payload information (Depren et al. [12])
or do not provide precise statistics (Nguyen [27]).
Cannady [6] proposes a SOM-based IDS in which net-
work packets are first classified according to nine features
and then presented to the neural network. Attack traffic is
generated using a security audit tool. The author extends
this work in Cannady [7, 8].
Nguyen [27] uses a one-tier architecture, consisting of a
SOM, to detect two attacks in the 1999 DARPA data set:
the first one (mailbomb) against the SMTP service, and the
other one (guessftp) against FTP.
Labib and Vemuri [20] use a SOM to identify Denial of
Service attacks. They discard information about payload
and use only packet header information; their data is col-
lected from a private network (described in a general way)
and is not publicly available.
Ramadas et al. [28] use a SOM to detect attacks against
DNS and HTTP services (using a private data set): they use
a pre-processor to summarize some connection parameters
(source and destination host and port) and then add several
values to track connections behaviour: the information is
then merged in a data structure used to fire events related to
the connection and to feed the neural network.
Depren et al. [12] present a hybrid IDS based on self-
organizing maps and benchmark it on the KDD 99 data
set [5]. They feed the neural networks (one for each proto-
col type) with six features extracted from each connection
(duration, protocol type, service type, status, total bytes sent
and received) and then use the quantization error method to
detect anomalies. The system is connection-oriented, there-
fore attacks can be detected only when the connection is
completely re-assembled. Regarding their architecture, the
authors state that the SOM used to model TCP connections
uses 1515 neurons; which in our opinion is quite large, if
compared with the ones used by our system.
4.2 Statistical-based systems
In addition to ADS based on neural networks, there exist
ADS employing statistical models to detect anomalous be-
haviour. We now report on them. Again, we cannot bench-
mark them against POSEIDON because they either use only
header information (Hoagland [14], Javitz and Valdes [16])
or employ benchmarking data that is not publicly available
(Kruegel et al. [19]).
Barbara´ et al. [3, 2] use data mining techniques to de-
tect attacks on network infrastructures: their system ADAM
first applies association rules techniques to identify abnor-
mal events in traffic data; then a classification algorithm is
used to classify the abnormal events into normal instances
and abnormal instances. The original work has been ex-
panded in [4]. Lee et al. [21, 22] propose a comprehensive
framework based on data mining. For a complete overview
of data mining techniques applied to intrusion detection see
Julisch [17].
The SPADE [14], NIDES [16] and PHAD [24] systems
rely on statistical models computed on normal network traf-
fic: they work by extracting features from the packet header
fields and trigger an alarm when they recognize a significant
deviation from the normal model; most of the features ex-
tracted are related to IP addresses (source and destination),
destination service port and TCP connection state (PHAD
uses up to 34 attributes coming from Ethernet, IP and appli-
cation layer protocols packets). Our approach differs from
the one mentioned here in the following aspects: (a) it is
payload-based: we use only destination address and ser-
vice port numbers to build a profile for each port moni-
tored, without taking care of other header features (of the
above systems only PHAD considers payload information,
we have compared it with our system in the previous sec-
tion). (b) We have a two-tier architecture in which the SOM
is used only to pre-process information.
Shifting to payload-based systems, Kruegel et al. [19]
show that it is possible to find the description of a system
that computes a payload byte distribution and combines this
information with extracted packet header features: they first
sort the resultant ASCII characters by frequency and then
aggregate them into six groups. As argued by Wang and
Stolfo [32], this leads to a very course classification of the
payload.
PAYL works in a way similar to Kruegel et al. [19]
but models the full byte distribution based on payload data
length and operates a clustering phase to cover possible
missing lengths. The PAYL architecture is made up of a
single tier, while our architecture has two different layers:
the first one, made up by a SOM, is delegated to classify
packets only using payload data information, without us-
ing payload length value. The second layer is a modified
version of PAYL that computes byte distribution models us-
ing the classification information coming from the first layer
and extracting destination IP address and service port from
packets header.
Zanero [34] presents a two-tier payload-based system
that combines a self-organizing map with a modified ver-
sion of SmartSifter [33]. While this architecture is similar
to POSEIDON, a full comparison is not possible because
the benchmarks in [34] concern only the FTP service an
no details are given about experiments execution. A two-
tier architecture for intrusion detection is also outlined in
Zanero and Savaresi [35].
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5 Conclusion
We present an approach to Network Intrusion Detection
that involves the combination of two different techniques: a
self-organizing map and the PAYL architecture. We modify
the original PAYL to take advantage of the unsupervised
classification given by the SOM, which then functions as
pre-processing stage.
Our experiments on the DARPA set show that our ap-
proach reduces the number of profiles used by PAYL (pay-
load length can vary between 0 and 1460 in a Local Area
Network, while the SOM neural network used in our exper-
iments has less than one hundred nodes). Our experiments
show that PAYL without SOM requires 3 times as many
profiles as with the SOM pre-processing (see Table 1).
We benchmark POSEIDON extensively against the
PAYL algorithm and data sets showing a higher detection
rate and lower false positives rate.
Acknowledgments We thank Herbert Bos for his valu-
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A Appendix: POSEIDON inner functions
In this section we describe the inner mathematical func-
tions and algorithms used by POSEIDON.
A.1 SOM algorithm
DATA TYPE
RR = [0 .0 ..255 .0 ]
/* Reals (Double) between 0.0 and 255.0 */
l = length of the longest packet payload
PAYLOAD = array [1 ..l ] of [0 ..255 ]
DATA STRUCTURE
N = non − empty finite set of neurons
for each n ∈ N let
wn := array [1 ..l ] of RR
/* array of weights associated */
/* to each neuron n */
α0 ∈ R /* Initial learning rate */
α := α0 /* Current learning rate */
r0 ∈ R /* Initial radius */
r := r0 /* Current radius */
τ ∈ N /* Number of training epochs */
k ∈ N /* Smoothing factor */
INIT PHASE
for each n ∈ N
for i := 1 to l
wn [i ] := random(RR)
/* Initialize with values in RR */
TRAINING PHASE
INPUT:
xt : PAYLOAD
for t := 1 to τ
/* Find winning neuron */
win dist := +∞
win neuron := n0
for each n ∈ N do
dist := manhattan dist(xt ,wn)
if (dist ≤ win dist) then
win dist := dist
win neuron := n
end if
done(for)
/* Process neighbouring neurons */
Nn = {n ∈ N | trig dist(n,win neuron) ≤ r}
for each nn ∈ Nn
for i := 1 to l
wnn [i ] := wnn [i ] + α ∗ (wnn [i ]− xt [i ])
α := α0 ∗ kk+t
r := r0 ∗ τ−tτ
done(for)
CLASSIFICATION PHASE
INPUT:
x : PAYLOAD
OUTPUT:
win neuron ∈ N
win dist := +∞
dist := win dist
win neuron := n0
for each n ∈ N do
dist := manhattan dist(x ,wn)
if (dist ≤ win dist) then
win dist := dist
win neuron := n
end if
done(for)
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return win neuron
A.2 PAYL algorithm
DATA TYPE
feature vector = RECORD [
mean = array [1 ..256 ] of Real ,
/* average byte frequency */
stdDev = array [1 ..256 ] of Real
/* standard deviation of each */
/* byte frequency */
]
profile = RECORD [
ip ∈ N, /* destination host address */
sp ∈ N, /* destination service port */
fv = finite set of n feature vectors
]
/* for each port monitored a profile */
/* with n feature vectors is associated */
DATA STRUCTURE
P = set of finite profiles
threshold ∈ R
/* numeric value used for anomaly */
/* detection given by user */
TRAINING PHASE
INPUT:
ip : IP address ∈ N
sp : service port ∈ N
n : SOM classification
x : PAYLOAD
for each p ∈ P do
if (p.ip = ip and p.sp = sp) then
fv = p.getFV (n)
/* get feature vector with index n */
fv .update(x )
/* update byte frequency distributions */
end if
done(for)
TESTING PHASE
INPUT:
ip : IP address ∈ N
sp : service port ∈ N
n : SOM classification
x : PAYLOAD
OUTPUT:
isAnomalous : BOOLEAN
/* is the packet anomalous ? */
dist := +∞
isAnomalous := FALSE
for each p ∈ P do
if (p.ip = ip and p.sp = sp) then
fv := p.getFV (n)
/* get feature vector with index n */
dist := fv .getDistance(x )
/* get the distance between input */
/* data and associated profile */
end if
done(for)
if (dist ≥ threshold) then
isAnomalous := TRUE
end if
return isAnomalous
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